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Neuhouser's interpretation has a certain "willful" quality. Having equated self- 
positing activity and intellectual intuition, for example, he treats them as simply identi- 
cal. He consistently reads Fichte's talk of the self's "activity" as a reference to "struc- 
tures in consciousness," as if there were no alternative readings. He thereby tends to 
miss the senses in which Fichte (like Kant) attributes a kind of "formative power" to the 
self in its original act, and the implications of this attribution for the self's "practical" 
nature. Thus, in his chapter on Fichte's account of practical selfhood, Neuhouser is 
very interesting on the topic of  how intellectual intuition renders the self "autono- 
mous," and causally independent, but has little to say about the self's active self- 
assertion. Not surprisingly, then, his discussion of the notion of "striving" is as weak as 
his account of intellectual intuition is strong. 
Altogether, Neuhouser has written a highly focused, if occasionally myopic, very 
informative and illuminating study, valuable even to students of Fichte who will find 
important fault with some of its main theses. 
A. J. MANDT 
Wichita State University 
Maudemarie Clark. Nietzsche on Truth  and  Philosophy. Modern European Philosophy. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 199o. Pp. xiv + 298. Cloth, $39.5 o. Pa- 
per, $12.95. 
Chapters x through 4 of Maudemarie Clark's important book offer a rich elaboration 
of some ideas first suggested schematically by John Wilcox': I will call them the Episte- 
mological Thesis (ET) and the Developmental Thesis (DT). According to Clark's ET, 
the "mature" Nietzsche believed we could have knowledge of the truth because he 
accepted (though not in these terms): (i) the "minimal correspondence theory" of 
truth: "Snow is white" is true (in a language L) iff snow is white; and (ii) that truth is 
epistemically constrained. Thus (to simplify a bit), since "snow is white" is true if and 
only if snow is white; and since whether snow is, in fact, white, cannot outstrip "our best 
standards of  rational acceptability" (6o) for beliefs concerning the whiteness of snow, it 
is possible for us to have knowledge of the truth-value of the proposition "snow is 
white." 
According to the DT, Nietzsche's view of truth changed during his career. In the 
early essay "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" (1873), he accepted the 
"metaphysical correspondence theory, the conception of truth as correspondence to 
the thing-in-itself" (22). BecaUse, under the influence of Schopenhauer, he thought we 
had no knowledge of things-in-themselves, he accepted the Falsification Thesis (FT): 
our merely "human" knowledge necessarily falsifies what the world is really like in 
itself. By the early 188os, Nietzsche came to reject the idea of  the thing-in-itself as 
incoherent. Yet he continued to accept the FT because he continued to accept the 
Schopenhauerian Representational Theory of Knowledge (RTK), according to which 
' Truth and Value in Nietzsche (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, x974), esp. 123-24. 
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our knowledge is o f  "representations" o f  things, not  things themselves. Only in his final 
six works, beginning with the Genea/0gy in 1887, does Nietzsche reject the RTK and 
come to realize that his rejection o f  the thing-in-itself in earlier works should lead him 
to the ET; this is why, Clark claims, we do not find the FT in any of  these late works. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, Clark shows how Nietzsche's perspecdvism and his criticism of  
the pursuit of  truth as an ascetic ideal are, in fact, compatible with his own belief in the 
possibility o f  truth. In Chapters 7 and 8, she argues that will to power and eternal 
recurrence are consistent with Nietzsche's rejection o f  metaphysics, because rather 
than being metaphysical doctrines, they are simply the foundations of  an alternative 
ideal to the ascetic ideal. Clark's discussion of  will to power is especially provocative, and 
will repay careful study. 
Let me venture four critical comments. (l) Against commentators (from Danto to 
Derrida) who contend that Nietzsche did deny the existence o f  truth, Clark notes that 
this "apparent nihilism in regard to t r u t h . . ,  threatens the coherence o f  his critique o f  
mora l i ty . . ,  insofar as the latter commits Nietzsche to certain truths while at the same 
time it denies that there are any truths" (4)- Yet Nietzsche makes such criticisms as early 
as Dawn, when, even on Clark's DT, he was still committed to the F T - - t h u s  presenting 
the specter of  incoherence again. 
(2) Clark assimilates Nietzsche's perspectivism to a sort o f  holism: "how things will 
look to us intellectually in any si tuat ion--how we are justified in interpreting t h e m - -  
depends on 'where we're at', that is, on what we already believe" (13o). Yet in the 
Geneodogy (III,  12), Nietzsche claims that what determines our  perspectives is our  
"affects" or  drives; he does not seem to assign any role to our  other beliefs. 2 
(3) Clark's neo-Kantian Nietzsche accepts that truth is independent  o f  our  "cogni- 
tive capacities (of what we can in principle verify)" (48), but denies that it is indepen- 
dent o f  our  "cognitive interests," that is "our best standards o f  rational acceptability" 
(6o). This distinction, however, will collapse if one thinks that verifiability is a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for  acceptability---our "best standards o f  rational accept- 
ability" will just  include, then, "verifiability." (Clark argues, not persuasively to my 
mind, against such a reading of  Nietzsche.) 
(4) Clark's historical scholarship is selective: much is said about the influence o f  
Schopenhauer, for  example, but nothing about the influence o f  the Presocradcs, whom 
Nietzsche so admired and whose very different view of  truth he often seems to echo. 
Clark brings a welcome argumentative engagement  to her reading of  the texts, and 
her treatment o f  the philosophical issues constitutes a significant improvement  over 
what has been typical in the Nietzsche literature. The  book is, at times, less sharply 
focussed than it might have been--par t ly  because o f  Clark's lengthy discussions o f  the 
views of  other commentators  (though, oddly, she omits any mention o f  Jean Granier's 
12 Problkme de la veri~ dam la philosophie de Nietzsche3); partly because o f  some belabored 
discussions, like the chapter on theories of  truth. 
,See my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in R. Schacht, ed., Nietzsche, 
Genea/ogy, Mora/ity (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming), sect. IV. 
s(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966). 
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None of  these critical comments should obscure the fact that this book is a major 
contribution to Nietzsche studies. Indeed,  o f  the many books written on Nietzsche over 
the last ninety years, Clark's study must rank as one o f  the three or  four most intelli- 
gent and rewarding. All students o f  Nietzsche will learn f rom reading this valuable 
work. 
BRIAN LEITER 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
Robert  B. Westbrook. John Dewey and American Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, i99i .  Pp. xix + 57 o. Cloth, $29.95. 
When James Gouinlock's John Dewey's Philosophy of Value appeared in 1972, it com- 
manded a field virtually empty o f  any extended treatments o f  Dewey's thought?  
Twenty years later, over a dozen major volumes have appeared,  f rom intellectual 
biographies to studies o f  his metaphysics, logic, aesthetics, philosophy of  technology, 
and philosophy of  religion.'  Westbrook's contribution, which is both a political biogra- 
phy and an inquiry into Dewey's philosophy of  democracy, may be one o f  the most 
important. It is certainly the best book treating Dewey's role in American history. I 
think it is also the best general introduction to Dewey's thought  as a whole. And while I 
have a few points o f  contention, I will begin by simply stating that Westbrook, an 
assistant professor o f  history at the University o f  Rochester, has produced nothing 
short o f  a masterpiece. I f  it exerts its proper  influence, it will serve to educate histori- 
ans, social theorists, political scientists, educators, and, last but not least, philosophers 
about Dewey, his troublesome heritage, and the unfinished task o f  democracy still 
before us. 
Westbrook recognizes that the full biography of  Dewey remains to be written. He 
has focused on "Dewey's career as an advocate o f  democracy" because "his democractic 
theory goes to the heart  o f  his philosophy" (x-xi). Insofar  as this includes Dewey's 
complex philosophical anthropology, this is true. The  purpose is that "it is high time to 
reassess [Dewey's] place in the history of  modern  American culture" (xiii). Against the 
dominant  view, which sees Dewey as a major influence in the formation of  modern,  
liberalism, Westbrook argues that Dewey's impact has actually been rather limited. "It  
is more accurate to see Dewey as a minority, not a majority spokesman within the 
liberal community,  a social philosopher whose democratic vision failed to find a secure 
place in liberal ideology-- in  short, a more radical voice than has been generally as- 
The major exception to this was G6rard Deledalle's important L7dle d'ex~'ience dans la 
philosophie de John Dewey (1967). 
, Among such studies should be mentioned: George Dykhuizen's The Life and Mind of John 
Dewey (x973), Victor Kestenhaum's The Phenomenological Sense of John Dewey 0978), Ralph 
Sleeper's The Necessity of Pragmatism 0986), my own John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience and 
Nature: The Horizons of Feeling 0987), Raymond Boisvert's Dewey's Metaphysics (a988), Larry 
Hickman ' s John Dewey's Pragmatic Technology (x99o), and Steven Rockefeller's John Dewey: Religimo 
Faith and Democratic Humanism (1991) . 
